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PAY AS RISK REGULATION
ANDREW C.W. LUND ∗
ABSTRACT
How do we prevent financial institutions from taking excessive risk when the public fisc
serves as creditor? This is one of the central questions left over after the recent financial
crisis and, for the past five years, there has been no shortage of proposed answers. Two of
the more popular candidates for ex ante regulation—proprietary trading restrictions and
enhanced capital requirements—are on their way to being enacted in one form or another,
albeit with some controversy over their cost and ultimate efficacy. Meanwhile, a third, more
indirect approach has sprouted in the pages of law and finance journals under which bank
managers’ compensation packages would be adjusted to include bank debt, thereby altering
their risk-taking incentives. This approach has even been put in place at certain non-U.S.
financial institutions. This Article offers a critical appraisal of regulating bank risk-taking
through executive pay design. “Risk regulation by pay” is less likely to ameliorate risktaking than more direct approaches because bank managers with career concerns will continue to face significant incentives to take on high levels of firm risk. Moreover, regulating
by pay is an inapt solution where marginal monitoring costs for creditors are relatively low
as is the case with bank monitoring. Instead, the case for regulating bank risk through pay
redesign must be grounded in a pessimistic view of regulator agency costs in a system of
prudential regulation. It is hard, however, to see how compromised regulators faced with
broad discretion would be much better at implementing a pay regulation regime. Thus, the
most effective version of risk regulation by pay will be afflicted with largely the same implementation problems as traditional, direct risk regulation. Even worse, the very fact of
risk regulation by pay, no matter how modestly proposed, makes it more likely that traditional direct monitoring will further atrophy, leaving the government-as-creditor worse off
than before.
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1. The Proposals .......................................................................................
2. Earlier Critiques ..................................................................................
III. COMPETING INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF DEBT
COMPENSATION.................................................................................................
IV. DEBT COMPENSATION VERSUS PRUDENTIAL MONITORING ...............................
A. The Costs of Prudential Monitoring ..........................................................
1. Collective Action Problems, Information Quality, and Expertise ........
2. Regulator Agency Costs ........................................................................
B. Regulator Agency Costs and Debt Compensation ......................................
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the explicit or implicit insurer of banks and other systematically important financial institutions, the federal government has an
obvious interest in constraining the risks taken by those firms. That
interest may trade off against the benefits of increased liquidity provided by banks’ willingness to take risks. But, at least since the financial crisis made the cost of these guaranties more salient, the
question of whether to reduce bank risk has given way to the question
of how to reduce bank risk. Some proposals—most notably the
Volcker Rule banning proprietary trading1 and enhanced capital requirements 2—would alter traditional prudential monitoring mechanisms, resulting in increased direct regulation of banks. 3
Parallel to these, another set of proposals would indirectly regulate bank risk by requiring bank managers’ compensation packages
to include some level of unsecured bank debt.4 The basic notion underlying these proposals is that introducing more debt into bank
managers’ portfolios would make those managers more sensitive to
their firms’ insolvency risks and therefore less likely to fall prey to
the moral hazard unique to banks. These proposals have been roundly applauded in the press 5 and appear to have gained some purchase

1. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); see also Press Release, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Agencies Issue Final Rules Implementing Volcker Rule (Dec. 10,
2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a.htm.
2. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409,
425-28 (2012) (describing the Basel agreements and recent calls for higher capital requirements).
3. Regulatory responses to excessive risk-taking are not limited to banks, as narrowly understood. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act permits designation of non-bank entities
as systemically important financial institutions that would subject such entities to prudential regulation traditionally reserved for banks. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012)). While there are
important differences, this Article groups banks and SIFIs together. This is consistent with
the approach taken in the proposals that are the subject of this extended critique.
4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247 (2010); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1821 (2012); Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix Banks, HARV. BUS. REV., June
2012, at 107; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2011); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive
Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible
Equity-Based Pay (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Center for Law & Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1633906; see also PATRICK BOLTON, HAMID MEHRAN & JOEL SHAPIRO, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, STAFF REPORT NO. 456, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK
TAKING 1 (2010) (suggesting tying bank CEO pay to the bank’s credit default swap spread).
Much of the theoretical groundwork for the debt compensation proposals was laid prior to
the crisis in a paper by Professors Edmans and Liu. See Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside
Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75 (2011) (first drafted and posted to SSRN in 2005).
5. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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among bank regulators 6 and even bankers themselves.7 This Article
offers a skeptical appraisal of this move to regulate bank risk-taking
by altering pay design.
Holding all things equal, altered compensation incentives should
lead bank managers to take on less risk in order to maximize the
value of their portfolio that would then include debt instruments sensitive to such risk. But, to this point, the debt compensation proposals do not fully grapple with the countervailing incentives created
by bank executives’ career concerns. As the managerial labor market
has become tougher on CEOs, advocates of increased debt compensation have a higher hurdle to clear in order to demonstrate that adding some amount of debt will counteract both the incentives provided
by mangers’ existing equity holdings and those arising out of simple
career concerns.
Resolving this question largely turns on empirical questions about
the managerial labor market discussed below. 8 However, regulating
risk-related moral hazard at banks through a compensation contract
seems somewhat misspecified even in theory. Bonding through incentive pay is traditionally seen as a second-best solution, primarily useful in cases where a principal’s monitoring costs are high. 9 Although
it is commonly assumed that monitoring costs are high for regulators
with respect to bank risk, 10 it is less clear whether those costs are
substantially higher than those of bank CEOs upon whose managerial acumen the pay proposals rely. The regulatory experience during
the financial crisis was not characterized by particularly high levels
6. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. To my knowledge, these papers have
been subjected to extended criticism only twice. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The
False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53 (2012); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards,
Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159 (2010); see also Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 708-11 (2012) (noting that the Tung and Bebchuk/Spamann
proposals are subject to criticism related to a broader argument about the efficacy of incentive pay); infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (describing Jeff Gordon’s briefer criticism of the Bebchuk/Spamann proposal).
7. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part III, for more on those empirics as well as studies analyzing the
effect of inside debt on firm risk-taking.
9. See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A
Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 32, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=794806 (“Obviously, if shareholders (or the board of directors)
could directly observe the firm’s opportunities and the executives’ actions and know beforehand which actions would maximize shareholder wealth, no incentives (including equity incentives) would be necessary . . . . To motivate the executive to take actions that are in
the best interests of the shareholders, compensation risk is imposed on the executive by
linking the executive’s wealth to firm performance (that is, the second-best contract is
used).”).
10. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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of regulator ignorance or bank obfuscation. 11 Moreover, and as others
have pointed out,12 there may be relatively simple ways to effectively
lower the costs of monitoring bank risk. Finally, bank managers’
monitoring costs may be surprisingly high in modern financial firms.
The more powerful case for regulating risk by pay is grounded,
rather, in a pessimistic view of regulator agency costs.13 Regulators
may not have the will to regulate banks as a normal creditor might
monitor another firm. Given recent events, it is indeed hard to argue
that enforcement incentives are ideal. Regulation by pay solves the
problem by relying on managers’ self-interest to reduce risk. However, regulation by pay implemented well in advance of any particular
bank risk-taking will likely be subject to greater regulator agency
costs than other forms of ex ante regulation that occur closer to the
point of risk-taking. So, in order to be preferable with respect to regulator agency costs, a debt compensation proposal would have to limit
regulatory discretion over its implementation. However, the discretion-reducing debt compensation proposals are exactly the ones that
are least likely to achieve socially optimal bank manager incentives
because there is no reason to think that, say, aping a bank’s capital
structure sets an efficient, risk-reducing contract. Thus, the effectiveness of debt compensation as a solution to the moral hazard at
banks will be at least uncertain prior to adoption.
Nevertheless, it may be that paying with debt would simply be
incremental to the array of regulatory tools available. If so, there
might be little harm in experimenting with debt compensation incentives, even if they ultimately turn out to be relatively insignificant.
However, there is reason to worry that the introduction of debt compensation into the regulatory toolbox might cause regulators to relax
prudential monitoring mechanisms. In fact, most of the debt compensation proposals specifically make this point about substituting indirect regulation for direct regulation.14 Even more troublingly, mistakenly evaluating debt compensation’s effectiveness at deterring
risk would be consistent with the historical overestimation of pay
structure’s impact on the incentives of corporate managers.
Part II introduces the oft-noted problem of moral hazard in banking given a world of government guaranties. It goes on to briefly discuss the traditional methods of prudential bank monitoring, many of
which appear to have failed in the months and years preceding the
11. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
12. E.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293
(2012).
13. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1015-22 (2012).
14. See infra Part II.
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recent crisis. Finally, it lays out the collection of proposals for indirect bank regulation through debt compensation that have been generated over the past four years.
Part III calls for some skepticism regarding the ability to produce
significant incentive effects by tinkering with bank managers’ pay. It
describes the new range of incentives facing bank managers, including evidence of a CEO’s increasingly fragile grasp on his or her position. The implicit equity performance conditions in the executive’s
employment arrangement—one must famously keep dancing while
the music plays 15—are apt to counter any risk-dampening effect of
debt compensation in the majority of cases.
Part IV offers a separate argument against using a bonding mechanism like debt compensation to fix firm risk-taking. It shows how
the conditions necessary for choosing (1) bonding via compensation
contract over (2) direct prudential monitoring are not obviously met
in the case of governmental regulation of banks. To the extent regulation by pay is preferable to traditional, prudential monitoring, it
must be because of high regulator agency costs—that is to say, regulators may not have incentives to forcefully use the information they
obtain. However, regulator agency costs are likely to prove as problematic, if not more so, for regulation by pay as they do for traditional
prudential regulation.
Part V suggests that the move to regulating bank risk through
pay may turn out to be more than just unhelpful. It may actually
displace prudential monitoring to a degree, as admitted by even
the most sober proponents. Apart from those admissions, Part V
describes how regulators and scholars have often overestimated
the level of incentive effects occasioned by tinkering with pay. Given
that history, there is reason to think they may do so again in this
new context, perversely leading to a more relaxed monitoring regime
than before.
II. THE DEBT COMPENSATION PROPOSALS
It is widely believed that banks took on high levels of risk in the
lead-up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009.16 As discussed below,
15. See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on BuyOuts, FIN. TIMES (July 9, 2007), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2sZ3TBW8d (“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.
We’re still dancing.”).
16. Among those who share this view, there is some disagreement over what counts as
“excessive” risk. See, e.g., Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 6, at 204. For instance, Bebchuk
and Spamann define it as negative-value “bets” that are nevertheless privately optimal.
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 255. This may be too strict a definition of “excessive”
from the point of view of creditors, who may even object to positive value bets that are particularly volatile.
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banks are subject to a particular sort of moral hazard occasioned by
the socialization of losses through federal guaranties. Much thought
has gone into solving the problem of bank moral hazard, culminating
in a series of proposals to adjust bank managers’ pay by adding more
bank debt to their portfolio. Those proposals are detailed below,
alongside the handful of voices to the contrary that have heretofore
been raised.
A. Bank Moral Hazard and Direct Regulatory Responses
Bank managers had substantial reasons to prefer excessive risk
and volatility during the run-up before 2007.17 Those managers were
appointed by boards answerable to shareholders and, in fact, were
significant shareholders themselves by virtue of historical equity
compensation arrangements. Whether through labor market discipline, compensation-related bonding, or a combination thereof, managers internalized equity preference for increased risk.18 Pre-crisis
banks, in this regard, were not very different from firms in other industries, with both shifting the preferences of risk-averse managers
toward those of risk-seeking, diversified shareholders. 19
Although bank managers were exposed to the same sort of incentive shifting as those in other industries, banks were uniquely likely
to take on higher levels of risk. Non-banks are already less highly
levered than banks, lowering the applicable risk baseline.20 More importantly, non-banks are generally subject to cross-monitoring by
creditors that often constrains risk-taking. 21 Banks have creditors
too—for instance, depositors at commercial banks—but bank creditors often have little reason to incur monitoring costs because the
bank debts are subject to implicit or explicit government guaranties.22 The government, in effect, stands in as the relevant creditor to
banks, but government regulators appear to have performed their

17. Simple human error also played a part in the excessive risk-taking that helped
cause the recent financial crisis. See Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong, & Jose A.
Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16176, 2010).
18. See Tung, supra note 4, at 1206-07.
19. Id. at 1214-18.
20. See, e.g., Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 6, at 168 (“All banks engage in some
form of the ‘carry trade’ that involves borrowing money in order to acquire assets that earn
a positive ‘spread’—or the difference between the cost of short term capital and the profit
generated by longer term lending. It is generally understood that the carry trade rewards
high-risk decisions because leverage amplifies the expected return for any investment.”
(footnotes omitted)).
21. Tung, supra note 4, at 1206.
22. See id.
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monitoring task poorly during the pre-crisis period. 23 The contours of
that failure are discussed in greater detail in Part III below, but
commentators have observed that the government failed to pump the
brakes as bank manager risk preferences were shifted toward those
of their shareholders. 24
Since the crisis, various legislative and regulatory attempts have
been made to dampen risk-taking at banks. Consistent with historical prudential monitoring, many of these approaches involve direct
oversight of banks’ behavior. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act
included a non-specific mandate to ban proprietary trading by
banks. 25 Recently that mandate has been codified in a final version of
the Volcker Rule. 26 Elsewhere, regulators and academics are pursuing enhanced capital requirements that would create a cushion
in case of failure so as to reduce the risk of bank insolvency. 27 Finally
and more modestly, some have suggested ways to simply strengthen,
without fundamentally changing, the existing bank examiner
monitoring regime. 28
23. See generally Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The
Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327 (2009) (detailing the
various missteps of regulators during the period leading up to the financial crisis).
24. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 53-54 (stating that a contributing factor to the
financial crisis was the alignment of managers and shareholders through incentive-based
pay); Tung, supra note 4, at 1222-23 (noting that prior to the financial crisis, bankers’ incentives were similar to “the standard shareholder-wealth-maximizing approach to compensation used in unregulated industries” and bank regulators failed to guard against risk
taking); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive
Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 436 (2010) (“After years of much rhetoric but little action, it appears that the federal government may be poised to take meaningful steps to increase executive compensation regulation.”).
25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851
(2012)). The statute leaves the contours of the rule to the rulemaking process, which is
susceptible to a scathing public choice critique. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe
the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2013). Moreover, a Volcker Rule that is able to usefully reduce bank risk-taking must distinguish between true proprietary trading and difficult-to-cabin alternatives like hedging and marketmaking. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS &
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 16 (2011).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1851.
27. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 2, at 425-26 (discussing Basel III’s increase in
bank capital requirements); Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in
the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive 57 (Rock
Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 161, 2013), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349739 (calling for even higher
capital requirements than Basel III).
28. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13 (calling for an incentive pay regime for
bank examiners); M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An
Auction Approach to Regulatory Assignments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1895 (2013) (calling for bank
examiners to select the firms they will examine); M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler,
Why Bank Regulation Failed . . . and Will Probably Continue to Fail (2012) (unpublished
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More indirect routes to reduce risk have also been suggested. The
Dodd-Frank Act mandated that financial firms’ boards install a risk
management committee comprised of independent directors. 29 The
committee would theoretically do some of the work of prudential
monitoring traditionally performed by regulators. 30 Alternatively, an
enhanced disclosure regime might permit market participants to
more effectively price bank risk.31 Those market participants, primarily subordinated debtholders,32 might helpfully complement traditional regulation under such a regime.
B. Paying with Debt
The most prominent proposals for indirect regulation, however,
seek to shape bank risk-taking by altering bank manager compensation. Under these proposals, bank managers supplied with newly calibrated portfolio incentives would themselves serve as complementary bank monitors. 33 The idea is an extension of the basic incentive
pay framework that has come to dominate public company governance over the past three decades. 34 Unlike the present situation with
banks, governance activists’ primary concern was that entrenched
managers, having significant firm-specific human capital invested in
their jobs, took too little risk, causing valuable projects to be avoided
and firm valuations to suffer.35 Performance-based pay serves as a
bonding device in situations where it is relatively difficult to observe

manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing to strengthen the regulatory veto held by bank
examiners by expanding precommitment devices of bank examiners); see also Saule T.
Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 63, 81-82 (2012) (collecting examples of “solutions to the problem of systemic
risk caused by increasing complexity of financial products and markets”).
29. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h), 124 Stat. at 1429-30 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h)).
The requirement is for all public bank holding companies and public non-bank financial
holding companies supervised by the Federal Reserve with assets of ten billion dollars or
greater. Id.
30. See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 106-07 (2011). There are
substantial arguments against relying on outside directors to shape firm performance in
this context. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial
Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
31. See Bartlett, supra note 12.
32. Id. at 305.
33. Whether the managers would be complementary or substitute regulators is discussed infra Part IV.
34. For another recent summary of executive-compensation-as-governance over the
years, see Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 56-59.
35. See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Spring 2003, at 21, 29 (“One of the most commonly alleged benefits of options is
that they help overcome managers’ natural aversion to risk.”).
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managers’ behavior, 36 where shareholders do not have the ability or
interest to monitor ex ante, 37 or where executive decisions affect firm
percentage returns rather than dollar returns.38 Determining the effect on firm behavior attributable to this sort of compensation tinkering has proven to be an econometrically difficult trick, 39 and there are
long-running debates over whether observed compensation structures reflect arm’s-length bargaining or managerial power. 40 Nevertheless, it is popularly believed that the introduction of heavy levels
of performance-based pay caused increased risk-taking economy-wide
over recent decades.41
In the light of that success, some commentators turned to managerial pay design in their attempt to adjust (now in a downward direction) risk-taking at banks post-crisis. In fact, even prior to the financial crisis and apart from banking, scholars were beginning to
model the use of debt compensation’s relation to firm risk-taking.42
In its most modest form, such an approach might call for a reduction
in equity compensation for managers 43 and/or longer holding periods
for equity stakes.44 More ambitiously, however, some proposals
36. For more on the question of observability, see Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and
Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979) (introducing his “informativeness” principle).
37. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2485, 2521 (O. Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999) (“In general, increasing
shareholder wealth involves investing in positive net present value projects, increasing
profits on existing capital, and diverting resources from negative net present value projects. There is a wide array of actions that affect shareholder value, including defining the
business strategy, choosing between debt and equity financing, making dividend and repurchase decisions, identifying acquisition and divestiture targets, selecting industries and
markets to enter or exit, allocating capital across business units, setting budgets for developing new products and businesses, hiring productive (and firing unproductive) subordinates, and designing, implementing, and maintaining the nexus of implicit and explicit
contracts that defines the organization. Expanding the set of potential actions that affect
shareholder value diminishes the role for ‘informativeness’ and increases the benefit of
tying pay to the principal’s objective rather than to measures of inputs.”).
38. See George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, CEO Incentives and Firm Size, 22 J. LABOR
ECON. 767, 778 (2004).
39. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 705 & n.121 (noting that endogeneity poses
particularly serious problems for drawing causal inferences from compensation data).
40. See id. at 711-15 (summarizing the debate). For a taste of the main points of disagreement, compare LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (suggesting managerial power
drives compensation choices), with John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (questioning the Bebchuk
and Fried account).
41. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 47 (2010) (“The structure of executive compensation, however, can affect
the risk of systemically important financial institutions.”); Tung supra note 4, at 1206.
42. See Edmans & Liu, supra note 4; Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007).
43. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 54 & n.3.
44. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive
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suggest altering the pay structure of bank managers so as to include
significant levels of bank debt. 45 This debt would bond managers
to the bank’s creditors to one extent or another as opposed to its
equityholders.
The inclusion of bank debt in pay packages would be new but not
entirely without precedent. Most bank managers already hold some
sort of inside debt. Many are entitled to unfunded future deferred
compensation and pension payouts that effectively function as debt
claims on the firm. 46 In a more mundane sense, future compensation
streams are subject to firm credit risk—exactly the sort of debt-like
interest that led to the push for enhanced equity pay in the first
place. The proposals discussed below, however, go beyond these existing practices and call for the inclusion of actual or phantom debt securities to be issued by banks or their parent bank holding companies.
1. The Proposals
At about the same time, Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, on
the one hand, and Fred Tung, on the other, proposed adding debt to
bankers’ pay packages in order to ameliorate the moral hazard problem at banks. Bebchuk and Spamann suggested a number of possible
structures, 47 but the one that has received the most attention is their
“pay-by-the-slice approach” that would tie bank manager compensation to the entire set of securities in the bank holding company’s capital structure. Tung’s approach was similar with two notable exceptions that seem to mark improvements. First, Tung would use subordinated bank-level debt as opposed to senior bank holding company
debt in order to cancel out potential noise created by non-bank seg-

Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361
(2009).
45. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4; Tung, supra note 4.
46. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L.
823 (2005); Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and
Its Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551 (2007); but see Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
& Colleen Honigsberg, The Hidden Nature of Executive Retirement Pay, 100 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (finding that much of executives’ inside debt is sensitive to share price
fluctuations and, in any event, is payable immediately upon departure from the firm).
47. Their alternatives include: (1) tying compensation to the value of the bank holding
company’s common stock and preferred stock issued to the government as part of the 2008
bailouts; (2) the pay-by-the-slice approach adjusted for bailout disbursements; (3) tying
compensation “to the aggregate value of the bank [holding company]’s common shares,
preferred shares, and bonds at the specified time minus the expected value of future government payments as proxied by the product of (i) the implied probability of default inferred from the price of credit default swaps at the specified time and (ii) the value of the
bank’s deposits at that time[;]” and (4) tying bonus compensation to “measures such as
earnings before any payments made to bondholders.” Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4,
at 283-85.
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ments within the holding company structure. 48 Second, Tung would
not necessarily mimic banks’ capital structures on the ground that
individual managers’ risk preferences are likely heterogeneous. Accordingly, there is no reason to assume that mapping capital structure onto pay structure would appropriately align any particular
manager’s incentives.49 Instead, boards should attempt to calibrate
an optimal basket of securities for any particular banker’s pay based
on specific bank and executive characteristics.50 This idiosyncrasy
limits the ability to directly mandate pay rules or guidelines as would
be available under a pay-by-the-slice approach.51 However, as an example of its potential workability, Tung suggested that deposit insurance premiums might be tailored to account for any compensation
structure adopted by the bank.52
In a similar vein, Wulf Kaal has recently suggested adding an unspecified amount of contingent convertible bonds to bank executives’
pay packages. 53 This debt would function similarly to the debt described by Bebchuk, Spamann, and Tung, but would convert to equity
upon the triggering of some objective threshold of credit deterioration.54 For signaling purposes, Kaal would set this triggering threshold lower than that used in convertible debt sold to the market.55
Jeff Gordon also suggests adding a debt-like pay element for
bankers. 56 In a sense, however, Gordon’s suggestion is the opposite of
Kaal’s. Rather than initially paying via a mix of debt and equity securities, Gordon would allow banks to continue paying managers
48. Tung, supra note 4, at 1231-35, 1236 & n.165. Additionally, market discipline
might be more likely for bank-level subordinated debt because of the greater likelihood for
periodic issuance of additional debt securities. Id. at 1231-34.
49. Id. at 1248.
50. Id. For banks, the designer would consider leverage, capital structure, investment
opportunities, ownership structure, default risk, and certain effects of the relevant bank
holding structure. Id. at 1248 & n.210 (collecting authorities). For managers, the designer
would consider their portfolios, including existing inside debt (generally pensions and deferred compensation). Id. at 1248.
51. This is likely a strong point in favor of Bebchuk & Spamann’s approach. See infra
Part IV.B.
52. See Tung, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
53. See Kaal, supra note 4, at 1854.
54. Id. at 1855-59.
55. See id. at 1869-72.
56. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 11. Importantly, Gordon departs from the BebchukSpamann and Tung approaches by assuming that shareholders at systemically important
financial institutions may internalize the costs of excessive risk-taking to a degree not
otherwise anticipated. This is so, argues Gordon, because institutional shareholders are
not able to diversify away systemic risk that excessive bank-specific risk might pose. Id. at
2-4. The problem of excessive risk-taking at banks, therefore, is not so much the traditional
equity/debt divide writ large as much as it is a reflection of particular incentives faced by
bank managers who are not efficiently diversified, having much of their wealth invested in
a particular bank’s equity securities. Id.
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with equity. That equity, however, would be subject to conversion
into subordinated debt (with a haircut) upon certain triggers—
regulatory downgrades, drops in key accounting metrics, and, perhaps, drops in share prices. 57 This approach clearly provides stronger
incentives to avoid excessive risk—at least as insolvency becomes
more likely—than Bebchuk and Spamann’s (and certainly Kaal’s)
proposal, since a manager’s entire portfolio would be conditionally
debt-like. 58
Finally, Sallie Krawcheck, formerly of Bank of America and
Citigroup, penned a Harvard Business Review op-ed in which she
joined the call for reconfiguring banker pay to include debt. 59 While
noncommittal about the necessary combination of equity and debt in
an optimal package, Krawcheck noted that “the most logical end
point would be a compensation mix that mirrors the bank’s capital
structure.” 60 Though the details are not spelled out, her approach is
reminiscent of Bebchuk and Spamann’s pay-by-the-slice approach.
Coming from a former “insider,” Krawcheck’s article has been celebrated as something of a breakthrough in bank governance. Her
compensation solution was positively noted by various press outlets,61
and a New York Times columnist wrote that the debt compensation
proposal was his “favorite” solution in Krawcheck’s article. 62

57. Id. at 11.
58. Tung’s proposal, modest as it is regarding the appropriate mix of debt and equity
at any given firm, could be structured so as to be debt-heavy and thus similar to Gordon’s
proposal, though the magnitude of the haircut in implementing Gordon’s proposal would
determine if even a debt-heavy version of Tung’s approach could match the risk-aversioninducing effects of Gordon’s. Gordon’s proposal also solves a potential problem of bank
managers with high equity positions failing to recapitalize banks when necessary. See id.
at 12 (noting that the proposal solves the “Fuld problem,” named for Richard Fuld, former
CEO of Lehman Brothers).
59. Krawcheck, supra note 4, at 108-09. Krawcheck also summarized the main points
in an entry for the Huffington Post. See Sallie Krawcheck, How to Make Banks Less Risky,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/salliekrawcheck/wall-street-reform-banks_b_1590794.html. Soon after publication, Krawcheck’s
name was floated as a possible SEC commissioner. See Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, As
Official Drops Out, S.E.C. Race Shifts, DEALBOOK – N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:54 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/as-miller-drops-out-race-for-s-e-c-chief-shifts/?_r=0.
60. Krawcheck, supra note 4, at 109.
61. See Shanny Basar, How to Fix the Banking System, FIN. NEWS (May 24, 2012),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-05-24/sallie-krawcheck-fixes-banks; In the Harvard Business Review, Sallie Krawcheck ’87 Calls for Banking Reform, MOREHEAD-CAIN
(June 1, 2012), http://moreheadcain.org/about/ news/sallie_krawcheck_hbr_bank_reform;
Alan Kline, Krawcheck: Banks Have a Governance Problem, AM. BANKER (May 24, 2012,
1:40
PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/people/sallie-krawcheck-harvard-businessreview-1049619-1.html; Adam O’Daniel, Ex-Bank of America Exec Sallie Krawcheck Shares
Advice for Banks, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (May 23, 2012, 2:49 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
charlotte/blog/bank_notes/2012/05/ex-bank-of-america-exec-sallie.html.
62. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The Simplicity Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A23.
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Actual implementation of such debt compensation proposals has
been sporadic to this point. Some British firms—Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds in particular—have included subordinated debt in
lieu of cash bonuses. 63 However, these alterations appear to have
been driven at least as much by balance sheet considerations as incentive effects. Barclays has also introduced contingent debt-like instruments into pay packages.64 In the United States, Kenneth Feinberg, serving as Pay Czar for the U.S. Treasury Department, forced
AIG to use “Long-term Performance Units” (“LTPUs”) when compensating executives in 2010. 65 The LTPUs were to be paid in cash on a
future date at a value keyed off of both AIG subordinated debentures
and common stock, at a four-to-one ratio. 66 Although the Pay Czar
has since faded from memory, the Financial Stability Oversight
Council retains the mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act to regulate
compensation at banks and systemically important financial institutions to reduce excessive risk. 67 In a 2011 proposed rule, U.S. regulators went so far as to cite approvingly academic work suggesting that
inside debt might mitigate risk-taking. 68 Thus, the debt compensation proposals described above may begin to play an even more significant role going forward.
2. Earlier Critiques
The response to these debt compensation proposals in law and finance journals has been relatively muted. Some of the criticism simply reflects internecine disagreements, which are not fatal to the general project. As noted, Tung criticized the pay-by-the-slice approach
for its assumption that parity between a bank’s capital structure and
an executive’s portfolio is the optimal solution for risk purposes.69
Such problems, though, are relatively fixable through tweaking—in

63. See George Parker et al., Lloyds Shares Volatile Despite PM’s Support, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3cfa60ca-0c20-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html
(Lloyds for 2008 bonuses); Jill Treanor, RBS Bows to Government Demand to Slash Bonuses, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/17/rbs-bonuspayments (Royal Bank of Scotland for 2008 bonuses).
64. See BARCLAYS, DELIVERING ON OUR PROMISES: BARCLAYS PLC ANNUAL REPORT
172-73 (2010), available at http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/Annual_Report_2010.pdf.
65. AIG, INC., LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE UNITS PLAN (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/5272/000095012310054330/y84839exv10w1.htm.
66. Id.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
68. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170, 21,199 n.123
(proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. and 17 C.F.R. pt.
248).
69. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.

622

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:609

this example, Tung would substitute a more tailored level of subordinated bank debt in the banker’s pay package.70
Less easily resolved are two sets of somewhat interrelated critiques, one from Jeffrey Gordon, 71 and the other from Kelli Alces and
Brian Galle. 72 Gordon’s argument is made in the context of his already discussed proposal for paying via convertible equity and is relatively brief. Referencing the Bebchuk and Spamann approach,
he makes three points. First, paying by the slice will require an initial determination as to what counts in terms of the firm’s capital
structure that a banker’s pay package is supposed to mimic. 73 Assuming these rules are generalizable, the pay-by-the-slice approach
might provide incentives for managers to game capital structure decisions just as they may have gamed ratings agency rules to achieve
helpful outcomes for their structured finance products. 74 Second, valuation is likely to be difficult for the more exotic bank securities that
one often finds in such firm’s capital structures. Many of these securities will not trade in thick markets, and consequently, there may
be new pressure placed on accounting measures, potentially giving
rise to a separate set of issues. 75 Finally, Gordon suggests that even
relatively thick debt markets may not reliably reflect bank risk, particularly given the current state of implicit government “too-big-tofail” guaranties. 76
Gordon’s criticisms are essentially practical, revolving around the
proposals’ workability. However, there may be reasons to think the
proposals are not as difficult to implement as suggested. For instance, Tung’s proposal to simply include an unspecified amount of
bank subordinated debt does not rest on an interpretation of a bank
holding company’s capital structure and avoids at least the first part
of Gordon’s critique. Moreover, to the extent that a pay-by-the-slice
approach would rely on such an interpretation, it is not obvious why
rules of thumb could not be developed. Of course, such rules might

70. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
71. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 9-10.
72. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 65-71. Karl Okamoto and Douglas Edwards
also criticize the proposals. See Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 6, at 182-205. They contend that forced deleveraging in an executive’s portfolio may in fact cause those executives
to seek out risk in order to at least potentially achieve payouts consistent with the recent
past. Id. at 192-93. They also argue that given a relatively high investment by the executive in the firm, it does not matter whether the investment comes in the form or debt or
equity because high risk presents the unattractive possibility of total loss in either case. Id.
at 193-96.
73. Gordon, supra note 4, at 9-10.
74. Id. at 10.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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serve as guideposts to inefficient restructurings, 77 though those fears
would appear to require significant mispricing of bank holding company securities in markets in order to present significant arbitrage
opportunities.
It might also be true that valuation problems would follow the inclusion of exotic debt securities in pay packages, but Gordon himself
notes that derivative markets and new accounting conventions would
do some of the work, and Tung provides evidence that at least the
market for subordinated bank debt functions reasonably well. 78 Finally, Gordon himself offers something of a solution to any insensitivity to bank credit risk—commit to excluding debt compensation from
any future bailouts. 79 In sum, Gordon raises points that are important and, for Bebchuk and Spamann in particular, difficult to
handle, but his argument need not be entirely persuasive to debt
compensation’s proponents.
Alces and Galle offer a more sustained critique of debt compensation. Their argument is complex but essentially makes three independent claims. 80 First, Alces and Galle posit that any excessive risktaking observed at banks is largely driven by previous compensation
choices, namely the introduction of massive amounts of equity pay
into managers’ contracts. 81 It would be simpler, they say, to just reduce this type of pay rather than to add a countervailing, riskreducing incentive through bank debt.82 Debt compensation’s proponents are entitled to respond, however, that there is surprisingly lit77. See id. These restructurings would function as a form of regulatory arbitrage
known to be endemic to financial regulation. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz,
Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 75, 77 (2013) (“[I]t is unrealistic to believe that complete ex ante regulation could
survive the political opposition of the financial services industry.”).
78. Tung, supra note 4, at 1230-31.
79. It is not clear that this outcome could not be achievable even ex post at the time of
bailout or even later. See, e.g., Gene Bloch, Treasury Pressure Leads to AIG Scaling Back
Bonuses, CNN (Mar. 15, 2009, 1:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/14/aig.bonuses/
index.html?eref=ib_us (noting how AIG reduced post-bailout retention payments to employees after receiving pressure from the Treasury Department).
80. Alces and Galle make other points as well. They argue that debt compensation
creates cross-monitoring costs for creditors beyond the class of creditors whose securities
are paid to managers. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 67-68. The basic idea is that creditors
that are either senior to or junior to the managers will have different risk preferences as
credit risk increases. This is certainly true, but it is not clear why those costs would be
greater than the monitoring costs those creditors currently face. Moreover, and as Alces
and Galle note, the pay-by-the-slice approach largely obviates this problem. Id. at 67-68.
Furthermore, Alces and Galle note that debt compensation must be managed to account for
the dynamism of a firm’s capital structure. Id. at 71-72. As they point out, however, rebalancing is available subject to transaction costs. Id. Alces and Galle correctly suggest
these transaction costs are incrementally harmful to the firm, though it is hard to see why
these costs should be particularly large.
81. See id. at 57-59, 64.
82. See id. at 65-66; see also Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 709 n.138.
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tle evidence that equity-laden compensation structures actually produced the sort of risk-taking seen at banks prior to the crisis. 83 Risktaking appears to have been driven by bank governance features, including, but not limited to, equity pay, meaning that simply removing
equity pay might not solve the problem of moral hazard. In a world of
multiple incentives to take high risk, adding debt compensation
might still serve as a counterbalance, depending upon the relative
strength of those prior incentives and the new debt. 84
Second, Alces and Galle puzzle over a conundrum at the heart of
the structuring of debt compensation. The new instruments must be
junior enough to actually make credit risk a significant concern for
executives 85 but not too junior so as to chance effectively transforming the security into equity. 86 The potential of bailouts obviously aggravates the former concern, and distinguishing management’s debt
from subordinated creditors’ would seem to be a solution. However,
Alces and Galle note that subordinating management’s debt claims to
the most junior (yet bailed-out) debt claims would make the claims
“too junior to align managers’ interests perfectly with any class of
creditors”; that is, they would be too equity-like. 87 The point here is
certainly true, but its practical import is uncertain. The key is the
requirement of something like perfect alignment. 88 In this case, the
two debt liquidation preferences—the most junior but potentially
bailed out claims and management’s ostensibly unprotected claims—
would share virtually the same level of seniority. Depending on the
magnitude of the debt securities held by the manager, it might be
difficult for him to confidently predict his bank’s assets in a future
insolvent state with enough precision to draw the line between his
claims and those of the incrementally more senior creditor. Although
the bank manager would not be exactly in the shoes of a hypothesized unprotected junior creditor, he would be pretty close, and one
might reasonably expect the manager’s decisionmaking to be in83. The most prominent study concerning the matter showed no significant association between pre-crisis equity incentives and firm performance. See Rüdiger Fahlenbrach &
René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis (Ohio State Univ. Fisher Coll.
of Bus., Working Paper No. 2009-03-013, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=1439859.
84. See infra Part III, discussing the strength of the managerial labor market in particular.
85. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 69.
86. Id. at 69-70.
87. Id. at 69.
88. See id. (“In order to have the effects its proponents recommend, inside debt compensation cannot be either too senior or too junior; rather, it must be ‘just right.’ ”); see also
Edmans & Liu, supra note 4, at 77-78, 89 (noting that under certain conditions, the optimal debt-equity ratio may have an “equity bias” or a “debt bias,” but a “debt bias is sometimes optimal”).
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formed by the interests of that hypothetical creditor for all intents
and purposes.
Finally and most persuasively, Alces and Galle argue that bank
managers will struggle to calibrate their behavior in the face of an
increasingly complex decision calculus brought on by the addition of
debt compensation. 89 Their discussion is rich, but, in short, they suggest that bank managers might behave randomly in response to additional debt incentives, relying on rules of thumb that may not be
linked to value-maximizing choices. 90 Alces and Galle anticipate
pushback on this point. First, we have no basis for determining the
level of pay complexity at which additional complexity becomes useless or even counterproductive.91 Perhaps we have already reached
that point with complicated equity pay arrangements, meaning that
equity compensation might not be increasing risk-taking the way
many people believe it does. Alternatively, we may be far away from
the threshold, allowing room for debt proposals to prove effective.
Second, Alces and Galle note that executives might be better positioned to deal with complexity than most, as they are necessarily sophisticated consumers of financial products with greater incentives to
understand the consequences of their behavior. 92 Finally, it may be
enough from the perspective of the proposals surveyed that new debt
incentives simply move the needle in the right direction for risktaking. 93 Thus, while Alces and Galle may be right that the inclusion
of debt securities would overwhelm the cognitive capacity of bank
managers, the point need not be fatal to the debt compensation project.
Each of these critiques of debt compensation is certainly plausible
and even persuasive. However, none of them are strong enough, even
taken in the aggregate, to require the conclusion that tinkering with
bank manager compensation is a bad idea. Parts III and IV attempt
to add to the case against regulating banks via pay.
III. COMPETING INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS
OF DEBT COMPENSATION
Bank managers face pressures and consequent incentives in an
enormous number of domains, making compensation structure just
one of a multitude of potential governance levers. To the extent those
other levers run opposite of new compensation incentives, the latter
89. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 76-79.
90. Id. at 77-78.
91. Id. at 79.
92. Id. at 79-80.
93. Alces and Galle do recognize this point, see id. at 82, but contend that increased
complexity might be debilitating in addition to merely confusing. Id. (“Using debt instruments may reduce executive sensitivity to all forms of incentives.”).
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may be relatively ineffective in shaping firm behavior. In fact, as
discussed below, debt-like instruments may be uniquely ill-suited
to stand out among contradictory demands on bank managers’
decisionmaking.
Within the corporate governance and finance communities, it has
been generally understood for decades that compensation structure
might complement other disciplinary devices in shaping managers’
behavior. 94 This has led to higher levels of equity pay, which, as noted, lines up on the other side of the bank risk-taking problem.95 Pay
structure was thought to be particularly effective where it was relatively difficult to observe managers’ behavior and where potential
monitors did not have the skill or motivation to do so. 96 That these
conditions might not hold for bank risk-taking is discussed in Part IV
below, but at the outset it is understandable that those seeking to
change bank decisionmaking would look to compensation structure
as a solution.97
For many reasons, bank CEOs face a different sort of world than
the one posited by the original advocates of pay-for-performance. Almost all of these changes have made it harder for the CEO to exert
unilateral control over the bank and instead nudge or even force decisions tending toward short-term share price maximization. 98 Institutional shareholders hold a greater share of the public equity market than ever before.99 Hedge funds and pension funds have taken the
lead in a new brand of shareholder activism and have drafted otherwise sleepy monitors like mutual funds to their side in battles with

94. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How
Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 139-40. For a primer on
the theoretical case for incentive pay, see Murphy, supra note 37, at 2519-28.
95. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
97. The remainder of this Part assumes that relevant bank shareholders uniformly
prefer high levels of firm risk, consistent with the literature for firms generally. See, e.g.,
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 255-56; Tung, supra note 4, at 1206. It is therefore
not responsive to Gordon’s claim that diversified bank shareholders largely internalize the
costs of systemic risk that individual banks might impose. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 5-6.
It is difficult to tell exactly how sensitive such shareholders are to systemic risk and
whether well-diversified shareholders or less-diversified shareholders will prevail at any
given firm. In any event, to the extent that shareholders seek to reduce risk at a bank, it is
unclear, given the subsequent discussion, why compensation need be one of the governance
levers utilized.
98. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691-709 (2010); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1039-40, 1051 (2010) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock,
Embattled CEOs]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 895-97 (2002).
99. See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 98, at 998; see also Paul Rose,
Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2010).
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management. 100 Proxy advisory firms have increased their influence,
generally lowering monitoring costs. 101 Furthermore, boards have become more active at enforcing share price maximization and other
shareholder-friendly decision rules at the same time that shareholders have increased their monitoring activities. 102
Nowhere have these changes manifested themselves more than in
an increasingly volatile managerial labor market at public companies, including large banks. The managerial labor market’s ability to
discipline, long viewed with skepticism, 103 has become far more robust. One influential study found that the average tenure of a CEO
had shrunk in the years after 1998 to less than six years.104 The increased turnover is not randomly distributed, as getting fired is becoming more and more closely tied to share price performance. 105 The
correlation between poor performance and turnover is particularly
strong in cases where firm performance falters relative to its peers.106
100. Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 98, at 998-1004. For more on the
interplay between activist investors and mutual and pension fund voting, see Ronald J.
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).
101. See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 98, at 1005-07. For an example of
the way in which proxy advisory firms wield influence over governance questions, see Andrew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 121, 126-27 (2010).
102. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 693-94.
103. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 9, at 30 & 45 n.2 (ignoring, for incentive purposes,
the threat of termination but noting that “[t]his assumption likely does not hold for CEOs
with large turnover probabilities”). Research performed at the end of the last century largely confirmed this view. See Murphy, supra note 37, at 2547 (finding a 7.9% probability of
departure for young CEOs at average-performing firms increasing only to an 8.5% probability if the young CEO’s firm realizes returns 30% below industry average); Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs 28-30 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=984376 (finding that “departure probabilities for CEOs realizing returns 30% below the
industry average were increased by 0.4% in the 1970s, 0.7% in the 1980s, and 0.4% in the
1990s” and concluding “that the turnover-performance relation . . . has fallen since the
1980s”).
104. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?
2 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/
steven.kaplan/research/km.pdf. This conclusion is consistent with the results of a recent
study finding that, as of 2010, the typical CEO of an S&P 500 firm had served for only 6.6
years. Joann S. Lublin, CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand, WALL ST. J.
(July 6, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870390000
4575325172681419254. In addition, the Wall Street Journal study found that (excluding
founders) only twenty-eight CEOs of the 500 S&P firms had served for more than fifteen
years, suggesting that the archetypal entrenched CEO has become a myth. Id.
105. See Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation 20-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12068, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12068.pdf (finding turnover strongly correlated with stock
returns consisting of firm-specific performance and industry-wide performance). The Wall
Street Journal study, see Lublin, supra note 104, similarly found that, of the twenty-eight
longest-serving CEOs, twenty-five had led firms whose share price performance had beaten
the overall S&P index over the term of their tenure.
106. Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 105, at 20-24.

628

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:609

Thus the threat of dismissal exists for all CEOs at firms where below-median industry-adjusted performance is a real possibility.107
While there may remain a threshold level of underperformance necessary to trigger labor market discipline, 108 it is harder to imagine
CEOs with career concerns exploiting any slack. 109
In addition, there is reason to think the labor market should be
particularly effective with respect to banks. First, banks and other
financial institutions are relatively homogenous, making firm-to-firm
comparisons a function of more objective measures for external monitors. 110 Second, the homogeneity reduces the value of firm-specific
capital, permitting lower cost turnover. 111 If comparisons and transitions are easier at banks, we should expect to see more labor market
discipline at financial institutions.
Just as these disciplinary mechanisms reduce the marginal impact of pay structures designed to align managers’ interests with equity, they similarly limit the incentive effect of those designed to
align managers’ interests with creditors. Whatever is done with pay
packages, equityholders’ interests will continue to drive bank manager discipline in the labor market. Assuming shareholder preference
for risk on the one hand and compensation incentives tilted heavily
toward debt on the other, bank managers will face two conflicting
imperatives—reduce risk and increase the value of the debt instruments, or increase risk and save their jobs. When Citigroup’s Chuck
Prince noted the need to continue “dancing until the music
stopped” 112—in other words, accumulating risk during the pre-crisis
bubble—he was surely not only talking about the personal portfolio
effects of doing so.

107. See id. For more on this data and its implications, see Lund & Polsky, supra note
6, at 702-03.
108. See, e.g., Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 105, at 3 (citing research to the effect that
CEO quality must fall below a threshold before a board will dismiss a manager). There
may be other factors entering into the calculus as well. Coates and Kraakman, for example,
demonstrate that CEO tenure has something of a term structure with respect to resignations and replacements via takeover (but not internal forced departures) for CEOs with low
share holdings. According to this model, the CEOs are relatively insulated for the first
three to four years of their tenure, followed by a period of increased turnover, culminating
in a period of lower turnover (perhaps demonstrating a survival effect, managerial power,
or both). See John C. Coates IV & Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies 15-17 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working
Paper No. 191/2007, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=925532.
109. Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 703.
110. Renée Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?, 9 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 123, 125 & 137 n.13.
111. Id.
112. See Nakamoto & Wighton, supra note 15.
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The case for debt compensation as a brake on risk-taking actually
turns out to be less convincing than the case for equity compensation
was as an accelerator for risk-taking. To see this, note the different
portfolio incentives created by adding options versus adding debt.
The level of debt compensation will have to be extraordinarily high to
create reasonably powerful incentives. Debt’s limited upside makes it
relatively expensive to use it to counterbalance pressures to maximize share price. Stock options are much cheaper incentive devices (in
grant-date value terms) since their asymmetric upside payout might
push a hesitant executive to take on outsize levels of risk for a chance
at substantially increasing share price. With inside debt’s fixed payout, however, the magnitude of inside debt holdings would have to be
much larger to cause a manager to eschew normal career concerns in
order to protect the debt portfolio’s value.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence marshaled in the debt compensation proposals suggesting that it might have positive effects on
firm risk-taking. For instance, some studies have found a correlation
between large CEO pensions and less risk-taking. 113 Along the same
lines, studies have shown that debt and equity markets react to disclosure of CEO debt holdings, implying that those markets predict a
change in firm behavior based on pay practices.114 As Alces and Galle
note, however, endogeneity may be an issue, since risk-taking and
pay design may be driven by CEO choices or firm culture. 115 The endogeneity explanation seems at the very least plausible given the apparent weaknesses of debt compensation described above. 116
This is all to say that paying with debt might have some effect on
the behavior of banks run by managers with extremely short labor
market horizons and exceptionally high levels of inside debt relative
to their overall wealth. For managers with moderate or long labor
market horizons and/or more varied portfolio holdings, however, we
have no right to expect very much from the proposed tweaks to bank
manager compensation.

113. E.g., Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 46, at 1554-55; see also Frederick Tung &
Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 3-4
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2012) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1570161; but see Jackson & Honigsberg, supra note 46 (linking CEO pension value to share price).
114. E.g., Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt
Incentives, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3813 (2011).
115. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 83; see also Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at
682-83.
116. In fact, Tung and Wang raise the endogeneity point explicitly, Tung & Wang, supra note 113, at 25, and conclude they cannot “make strong causal inferences from the
data.” Id. at 27.
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IV. DEBT COMPENSATION VERSUS PRUDENTIAL MONITORING
Aside from pay regulations’ diminished effect in a new managerial
labor market, bank risk-taking may not be an obvious candidate for
preferring indirect regulation to more direct prudential monitoring.
Direct monitoring already exists through bank examiners and a substantial regulatory regime, meaning that marginal implementation
costs of better direct monitoring are much smaller than they might
be otherwise. Informational asymmetries, commonly named as the
downfall of prudential monitoring, may be somewhat surmountable. 117 Regulatory agency costs—the lack of monitoring will on the
part of individual regulators—are real and problematic in the context
of prudential bank monitoring. However, those costs attend to all ex
ante bank regulation that grants broad discretion to regulators, including a debt compensation regime. 118
A. The Costs of Prudential Monitoring
Optimizing bank risk through pay design makes sense when monitoring costs are high. In such situations, it is more efficient for the
monitor (here, the government-as-creditor) to condition payments to
the agent (here, bank managers) on some sort of performance measure than to incur those high costs of monitoring its behavior (here,
risk-taking).119 This basic insight supports, for instance, the use of
equity pay in an optimal contract between dispersed shareholders
and managers of large, public companies. Those dispersed shareholders are unlikely to monitor if the costs are even marginally high because of well-known collective action problems. 120 Worse yet, the costs
to public company shareholders of monitoring project selection are
high because of the open-ended nature of the equity contract and a
lack of expertise.
On the contrary, where marginal monitoring costs are low, performance-based pay is less necessary. 121 For instance, in the case of
firms in bankruptcy, creditor groups are already committed to invest117. See infra notes 149, 177-78, 180 and accompanying text.
118. The problems with relying solely on ex ante bank regulation are discussed in
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 93-102. The authors discuss the unavoidability of
accidents, problems of regulatory capture, and over-deterrence of risk-taking. The second of
these is discussed in greater detail below.
119. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 201-03
(2002).
121. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is CEO Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too
Low? A Wealth-Based Contracting Framework, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2010, at 5, 12
(“To the extent that boards and shareholders can either directly monitor CEOs’ actions or
use other governance mechanisms to indirectly reduce agency conflicts, strong performance-based incentives will be less necessary.”).

2014]

PAY AS RISK REGULATION

631

ing high levels of monitoring resources, thereby obviating much of
the need for performance-based pay.122 Because performance-based
pay devices are most beneficial as monitoring costs increase, the appropriateness of debt compensation for bank risk-taking necessarily
turns on the magnitude of those monitoring costs.
1. Collective Action Problems, Information Quality, and Expertise
In most respects, the marginal monitoring costs for prudential
regulators are relatively low. The federal government faces no serious collective action problem because it is explicitly the creditor to all
banks for federally insured deposits and implicitly the creditor for
many bondholders and counterparties at too-big-to-fail banks. 123 Furthermore, the government should have relatively low marginal costs
for gathering additional information going forward.124 For a long
time, national banks, state banks, bank holding companies and other
FDIC-insured institutions have been subject to review by bank examiners employed by one regulatory body or another. 125 Since DoddFrank’s enactment, the FSOC may require similar examinations of
systemically important non-bank financial firms by the Federal Reserve.126 These bank examiners are on site at banks on a regular basis reviewing bank assets and operations. 127 Todd Henderson and
Fred Tung, for instance, report that the equivalent of twenty examiners were monitoring Washington Mutual for over 200 days annually during the 2003–2008 period. 128 During such periods, bank examiners have access to all aspects of the bank’s operations. Additionally,
none of the post mortems from the financial crisis suggest that bank
managers systematically misled regulators by withholding information from them. 129
Further, there may be relatively easy ways to enhance information gathering by regulators. Robert Bartlett, discussing the con122. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Response, The Problematic Case for Incentive Compensation in Bankruptcy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 88, 94-96 (2007); Robert K. Rasmussen, Response, On the Scope of Managerial Discretion in Chapter 11, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 77, 77-78 (2007).
123. Individual regulators may face collective action problems as a part of a team, but
this is a type of regulator agency cost discussed infra Part IV.A.2.
124. To be sure, the initial installation of bank examiners imposes serious costs. However, the existence of bank examiners is part of the baseline from which the debt compensation proposals spring, and as such, those costs are not appropriately counted in this context.
125. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1016-21.
126. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
127. For an overview of the role played by bank examiners, see generally Henderson &
Tung, supra note 13, at 1016-21.
128. Id. at 1017.
129. See, e.g., id. at 1021-26.

632

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:609

text of increasing market-based monitoring of bank risk, suggests
that disclosures adapted for easier credit modeling could be crafted
for transmission to the relevant monitor.130 Bartlett points out that
the granularity missing from such disclosure might pose problems,131
but bank regulators would have the ability, post-disclosure, to delve
into the details of a bank’s operations in ways that ordinary market
participants would not. Furthermore, confidentiality concerns are
much less serious in cases of monitoring by regulators than they are
in cases of market monitoring.
Traditional critiques of prudential monitoring have also alluded to
the lack of expertise on the part of regulators.132 The idea is that even
if raw information about bank positions is made available to regulators, bank examiners and their supervisors are hopelessly overmatched by better-informed bank managers. 133 Of course, we might
expect bank managers to understand their firm’s risk more than
bank examiners, but the degree of that difference is unclear. Henderson and Tung, for example, conclude their review of post-crisis summaries of bank failures by noting that bank examiners were generally aware of the problems at distressed institutions well before they
became public and did not suffer a failure to understand what was
happening. 134 Moreover, as discussed above, there is no reason to
think that new disclosure mandates could not be produced to further
level the playing field between managers and regulators.135
Even taking some level of regulator ignorance for granted, bonding managers to certain risk levels through debt compensation is only
useful to the extent that managers are in a better position to understand the risk. If regulatory ignorance is due to, say, the complexity
of modern financial institutions, then relying on bank managers to
self-discipline will not help matters if those managers are equally
ignorant. Along these lines, some scholars have suggested that much
of the excessive risk-taking that occurred at banks in the run-up to
the financial crisis was caused by secondary managers at banks who
were able to shape their trading decisions to take advantage of flaws
in the Value at Risk (“VaR”) credit model. 136 The supervisors of these
130. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 369-82.
131. Id. at 377-79.
132. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Review Essay, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457,
1463 (1993) (reviewing PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF
MODERN WALL STREET (1992)).
133. See id.
134. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1015.
135. See Bartlett, supra note 12, 369-82 (suggesting a disclosure regime to increase
transparency).
136. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460-61 (2009) (observing that VaR
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middle-level managers relied on VaR models to evaluate their performance without fully understanding what was missing from the
model. 137 To the extent that such information or expertise problems
are either surmountable or equally experienced by bank managers,
debt compensation proposals are bound to be less effective.
2. Regulator Agency Costs
The failure of prudential monitoring is apt to be a story of the lack
of monitoring will. Henderson and Tung make this point explicitly in
their recent work. 138 That recognition led them to suggest tinkering
with regulator pay to encourage more forceful bank monitoring.139
Alternatively, one could imagine relaxing the civil service protections
afforded to bank regulators to give them greater career-oriented incentives to intervene. More to the point, comparing direct regulation
(prudential monitoring) and indirect regulation (debt compensation)
turns out to be a difficult empirical question reducible to the respective discounts imposed on the former for regulator agency costs and
the latter for bank managers’ insensitivity to pay structure. 140 This
question might be less thorny than it immediately appears, however.
If regulator agency costs would be roughly equivalent in a debt
compensation regime, it ceases to be preferable to prudential monitoring on any count as even weak concerns about debt compensation’s
effectiveness discussed in Part III would tend to dominate. 141 That is,
debt compensation proposals are unconvincing unless they are at
least better at dealing with regulator agency costs than traditional
prudential monitoring.
B. Regulator Agency Costs and Debt Compensation
Other than Jeffrey Gordon’s proposal, which suggests that shareholders might voluntarily opt for risk-reducing compensation structures,142 all of the other debt compensation proposals heretofore discussed implicitly or explicitly rely on regulatory intervention to disrupt the compensation status quo.143 The most draconian version of
did not account for events with a de minimis chance of occurring even if the cost to the firm
in the rare negative case would be catastrophic).
137. Id. at 461-64.
138. See generally Henderson & Tung, supra note 13.
139. Id.
140. The debt compensation proposals are unlikely to impose significantly higher compensation costs on firms because the debt is unlikely to engender much of a risk premium
required by managers. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
141. Alternatively, the equation might be solved by a reduction in regulator agency
costs. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1031-41.
142. Gordon, supra note 4, at 13.
143. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 278-79; Tung, supra note 4, at 1247.
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regulatory intervention might involve direct involvement of regulators in structuring bank manager pay packages as seen post-crisis
in the work of the Pay Czar. 144 A more limited version would, for example, call for softer third-party intervention by altering deposit
insurance premiums to account for more or less risk-friendly pay
structures. 145 Obviously, a number of approaches that fall between
these poles are available. In all cases, however, regulatory action will
likely be required to set up a scheme for evaluating and enforcing
pay norms.
The debt compensation proposals leave largely unaddressed this
question: Why should we expect regulators to be more aggressive in
forcing risk-reducing pay practices onto bank managers than they
would be in their traditional role of monitoring bank risk-taking? 146
There is at least some reason to think that the problem of regulatory
forbearance and/or capture might be more acute in the context of
compensation setting. Stories abound of extraordinary industry
pushback against regulatory incursions into pay setting. 147 Generally,
regulators have been loath to force firms to compensate executives in
particular ways or at particular levels. 148 Moreover, at the time when
debt compensation approaches would have to be adopted, regulators
might have little reason to think that any particular bank is actually
taking on high levels of risk. Faced with no emergency to focus their

144. See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012) (mandating compensation restrictions on recipients of
bailout funds).
145. Tung, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
146. Tung notes the problem. See id. at 1250 (“Relying on regulators to incorporate
banker pay arrangements into their discretionary regulatory strategies carries certain
risks, of course[,] . . . [including] the standard regulatory agency conflicts . . . .”).
147. For reaction to the government’s implementation of TARP see, for example, Eric
C. Anderson, The TARP Travesty, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2009, 2:33 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-c-anderson/the-tarp-travesty_b_387504.html; Bank of
America’s TARP Repayment: Ken’s Last Act, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/15020046; Rick Newman, Why Goldman Sachs Should
Repay Its TARP Money, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2009/03/24/why-goldman-sachs-shouldreturn-its-tarp-money. For reaction to the government’s implementation of § 162(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code, see, for example, JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., EMPLOYEE
STOCK OPTIONS: TAX TREATMENT AND TAX ISSUES 9-10 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31458.pdf; Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. S138 (2002); Norman R. Augustine, Op-Ed., Raise the Price of Fame,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/
06/16/opinion/16augustine.html?r=0; Editorial, Chairman Frank, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 5, 2007,
at 6, available at http://www.nysun.com/editorials/chairman-frank/46160.
148. See, e.g., Andrew C.W. Lund, Tax’s Triviality as a Pay-Reforming Device, 57 VILL.
L. REV. 571, 585-86 (2012); David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem,
93 B.U. L. REV. 325, 376-84 (2013).

2014]

PAY AS RISK REGULATION

635

attention, regulators might reasonably be expected to be more lax in
their oversight of bank behavior. 149
The case that regulation by pay might be less susceptible to regulator agency costs is likely to depend instead on the specificity and
rigidity of the pay regulation ultimately adopted. That is, the magnitude of any regulator agency cost problem is in significant part a
function of the discretion left to the regulators when they mandate
pay.150 As implementation of any particular debt compensation becomes more complicated, regulatory discretion must increase. That
increase, in turn, will permit regulator agency costs to multiply,
reducing any benefits achieved by the debt compensation proposals
and permitting the same pathologies observed in the prudential
monitoring context.
What might the debt compensation proposals look like in practice?
Proponents are split on the question of ex ante specificity. Tung
would require little: “Because of each bank’s unique situation and the
fine judgments required to optimize compensation arrangements,
strict regulatory mandates seem inadvisable. Generalized mandates
are likely to offer a poor fit for many banks, and mandates may be

149. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 96-97 (“Ex ante—before a crisis emerges—proponents of enhanced financial oversight confront a formidable asymmetry in political power between the financial industry and the general public. Special interests oppose
meaningful constraints on risk taking, and the general public has neither the means nor
the interest to compete with them. Only in the wake of a severe economic downturn does
public discontent tend to translate into regulatory reform.” (footnotes omitted)). On the
other hand, the particular salience of executive compensation may conceivably steel regulators’ will or cow bank managers. See Joe Nocera, Pay Cuts, but Little Headway on Larger
Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/10/23/business/23nocera.html (discussing that Kenneth Feinberg “tried hard to balance the desire among angry taxpayers to see pay curbed at the companies [the government] had to save last year”); see also David Ellis, Wall Street Fat Cats Fear the Pay Czar,
CNNMONEY (Oct. 20, 2009, 2:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/20/news/companies/
feinberg_compensation/index.htm (noting that Kenneth Feinberg “suggested” that “outgoing Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis . . . not accept a salary or bonus for 2009”); Eamon
Javers, Feinberg Touts His Special Mastery, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2009, 4:51 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28635.html (stating that Feinberg “rejected the
initial proposals of every single company involved [in the executive compensation
process]”).
150. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
546 (2000) (“Scholars have expended considerable energy in particular on structuring and
disciplining the exercise of discretion in order to limit agencies’ freedom ‘to do as they
please.’ ” (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 777 (1999))); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules:
Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 436-37
(1999) (“It is hard to argue against empowering regulators with greater flexibility to better
serve the purposes underlying regulation. Problems arise, however, when different individuals characterize the purposes of a regulatory scheme.”); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 557 (2011) (“After all, agencies need discretion to
determine when to enforce their own regulations.”).
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difficult to revise in the face of changed circumstances.” 151 For Tung,
a range of bank-specific and manager-specific factors will cause optimal packages to diverge across cases.152 This tracks the point wellunderstood in the finance literature that optimal compensation contracts will vary.153
Others appear more open to simplifying matters. Bebchuk and
Spamann’s proposal, along with Krawcheck’s, seem to point in this
direction, although it is less clear that they do so in order to minimize
regulator agency costs. Bebchuk and Spamann’s proposal is far more
detailed and is worth examining further. As noted, they would replace the currently equity-heavy banker pay structure with one representing a basket of the firm’s securities, including common stock,
preferred stock, and bonds. 154 Nothing in Bebchuk and Spamann’s
proposal requires that the basket of securities in the manager’s pay
structure mimic the capital structure of the bank (or bank holding
company).155 In fact, in a preliminary version of their article, Bebchuk and Spamann seemed to concede, pace Tung, that “[o]ptimal
setting of executive pay arrangements requires substantial information,” which makes most sense if the basket approach they advocate permits something more complicated than mere replication of
the firm’s capital structure. 156 Nevertheless, the few responses to
Bebchuk and Spamann’s proposal that have been written have characterized it as a “slice of the capital structure” approach, 157 and they
at least appear not to have disavowed that characterization. 158
The noteworthy characteristic of such an approach is that it is
likely to lower regulator agency costs. There would be a compensation “rule” to be applied mechanically. This “rule” would leave little
151. Tung, supra note 4, at 1249; cf. Edmans & Liu, supra note 4, at 92 (“[T]he manager’s debt-to-equity ratio is increasing in his effect on the liquidation value and the probability of bankruptcy, and decreasing in growth opportunities.”).
152. Tung, supra note 4, at 1248. Tung suggests the following factors from the inside
debt literature: leverage, capital structure, corporate structure, investment opportunities,
ownership structure, default risk, and managers’ personal portfolio characteristics. Id. at
1248 n.210 (collecting authorities).
153. E.g., John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 152 (1999).
154. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 283-85. The authors recognize the distortive effect of implicit government guaranties on bank securities prices and suggest accounting for potential bailouts by subtracting their value from the firm value referent. See id. at
284.
155. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
156. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay 45 (Harvard
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 641, 2009).
157. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 64; Tung, supra note 4, at 1244; Gordon, supra note
4, at 9.
158. Krawcheck’s advocacy of this aping approach is more explicit. Krawcheck, supra
note 4, at 109 (“Any shift in this direction would have an impact, but the most logical end
point would be a compensation mix that mirrors the bank’s capital structure.”).
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room for shirking by regulators and would seem to make forbearance
harder to come by for banks and managers. It is true that there
might be complicated questions about characterizing or replicating
certain securities in the capital structure, 159 and that the rigidity of
the rule may encourage bank managers to opt for inefficient structures,160 but with some trial and error, mimicry may be readily
achievable. What we gain by thinking in these terms is a plausible
case in which regulating via pay dominates traditional bank monitoring by significantly reducing regulator agency costs.
Two concerns immediately arise, however. First, as already noted,
one-size-fits-all guidelines will often be imperfectly calibrated in any
given case. 161 The question of discretion trades off efficient tailoring
of compensation contracts against regulator agency costs. Taking the
Bebchuk, Spamann, and Krawcheck approach, for example, it is hard
to imagine how a simple “pay by the slice” approach would appropriately structure optimal risk-taking incentives at many firms, 162 even
assuming a high level of sensitivity on the part of bank managers.163
Managers’ existing portfolio holdings will vary considerably, particularly so at the moment of pay regulation’s implementation, but also
for any internal hires who accumulated debt (such as deferred compensation or a pension) or equity (shares or stock options) holdings at
an earlier career stage. Moreover, managers’ background levels of
wealth, career horizons, and risk aversion are bound to be heterogeneous, making a capital-structure-mimicking approach rough justice
at best. 164
Further, if we allow regulation by pay through operation of a simple rule notwithstanding these potential inefficiencies, it raises the
question of whether traditional prudential regulation should be entitled to the same generosity. For example, if we are willing to settle
for rough justice regarding capital adequacy and accept that the rules
might be suboptimal as applied to many firms, some of the arguments against enhanced requirements under Basel III begin to fall
159. Gordon, supra note 4, at 9-10. The Internal Revenue Code may also pose problems
as more exotic instruments are used. See 26 U.S.C. § 409A (2012) (requiring certain types
of nonqualified deferred compensation to be included in gross income).
160. Gordon, supra note 4, at 10.
161. See Tung, supra note 4, at 1245.
162. See id. (“Because bank managers’ individual situations will vary in ways that are
not correlated with their BHCs’ capital structures, there is no conceptual basis for assuming that executive pay in the form of a representative slice of the BHC’s securities will offer
appropriate incentives to internalize risk at the banking subsidiary.”).
163. For reasons to think that pay incentives might be drowned out anyway, see supra
Part III (competing labor market incentives), and supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text
(describing Alces and Galle’s behavioral psychology claim).
164. For more on the intensely idiosyncratic nature of optimal compensation design,
see Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 711-15.
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away. 165 To be sure, questions would remain concerning the effect of
particular capital levels and their relationship to liquidity in the
economy, 166 among other things. But the heterogeneity of optimal
capital requirements across firms would become less important as
monitoring and compliance costs were discounted. 167 Similarly, if
regulators are permitted to adopt a rough version of the Volcker Rule
so as to prevent potential regulatory capture, the arguments against
such a rule become more limited.168
Granting all of that, one-size-fits-all compensation structures
might impose a different level of social costs than one-size-fits-all
prudential monitoring rules. Regulation by pay with low regulatory
discretion, like other pricing mechanisms, may prove informationforcing and therefore preferable to command-style direct regulation.
It is at this point that the arguments about debt compensation’s ineffectiveness discussed in Part III reappear, however.
V. THE DANGER OF REGULATING BY PAY
Nevertheless, a proponent is entitled to point out that any incentive shifts occasioned by compensation tinkering, however weak,
would be better than nothing. After all, it is hard to see what harm
increasing the level of bank debt held by managers might cause. In
fact, Tung, 169 along with Bebchuk and Spamann,170 make this very
point near the end of their proposals.171

165. For more on the critiques of capital requirement rigidity, see Admati et al., supra
note 27; see also infra note 176.
166. Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements, 55 J.
MONETARY ECON. 298, 299 (2008) (“[C]apital adequacy regulation can impose an important
cost because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity by accepting deposits.”).
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 25, at 67-68 (“Affected industry members contend
that zealous enforcement of the proprietary trading ban, which could restrict other bank
principal positions, would impair customer service, market liquidity, and other beneficial
functions performed by many banking entities. . . . Balancing these competing concerns
and implementing workable and enforceable definitions of permitted and prohibited activity falls to the five federal agencies charged with Volcker Rule implementation.” (footnote
omitted)).
169. Tung, supra note 4, at 1250-51.
170. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 285 (“However, that executives may
have other sources of incentives to take excessive risks to benefit common shareholders
hardly implies that it would be undesirable to place limits on the extent to which pay arrangements provide executives with such incentives; such limits would at least move us in
the right direction.”).
171. Krawcheck does not and, as will be discussed later, appears to assume significant
effectiveness on the part of pay regulation. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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A. Compensation Costs
This modest formulation is actually more supportable in the case
of shifting toward debt compensation than it was when pay shifted
toward levels of equity beginning in the 1980s.172 Absent incentive
effects, it is well-understood that substituting fixed pay for equity is
an inefficient way to compensate managers, primarily because the
riskiness of equity pay inclines managers to require a premium beyond their reservation wage in order to bear the new risk.173 Moreover, there is a well-developed view that equity-heavy packages, particularly when options did not have to be expensed, were misperceived by boards as being cheap forms of compensation. 174
Substituting debt for equity, on the other hand, generally lowers
the risk borne by managers and should, therefore, lower the premium
they require to accept a given pay structure. At the very least, a shift
toward greater debt compensation should not entitle bank managers
to extract an additional risk premium beyond the one they currently
obtain. Moreover, there is likely little confusion in a director’s mind
regarding debt’s effect on a bank’s balance sheet. Accordingly, tinkering with compensation in this way should not cause compensation
costs at banks to explode. 175
Two caveats to this happy state of affairs are in order, however.
First, this assumes that a shift to increase the proportion of inside
debt is not effected by simply adding incremental debt onto existing
pay packages, as might be the case under circumstances of significant managerial power. Second, this also assumes that, even in a
world of static total compensation, the increased debt payments come
at the expense of equity pay rather than salary or perquisites. Inside
debt, while less risky than equity, will nevertheless be riskier than
salary and perks, which may cause managers to charge a risk premium for the substitution. Should either of these assumptions fail, debt
compensation proposals would become more problematic.

172. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
173. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 16 (2002) (“[T]he economic cost to shareholders of granting options often
far exceeds the value that employee-recipients place on the option.”).
174. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002).
175. See Edmans & Liu, supra note 4, at 77 (“Even in situations where bonuses can
attenuate risk-shifting, inside debt can be a cheaper solution since its sensitivity to liquidation values renders it a more powerful instrument.”). However, the switch to debt compensation may increase transaction costs. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 71-72. This,
along with concerns about regulator agency costs, may counsel in favor of a rough, pay-bythe-slice approach.
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B. Perceived Substitution Effects
In any event, the move to debt compensation might cause other
problems. For instance, such a shift could lead to a concomitant relaxation of prudential monitoring by regulators. If increased debt
compensation would reduce regulatory vigilance in other ways, there
could be a social loss to the extent the shift to debt compensation
promised more than it delivered regarding manager behavior as
discussed above.
This concern is hardly fanciful in regard to Krawcheck’s proposal.
Prior to suggesting a pay-by-the-slice approach (as well as a new dividend policy and a reduction in the role of net interest income in performance evaluation), Krawcheck claims that traditional prudential
monitoring via capital requirements is problematic. 176 Her debt compensation proposal is explicitly envisioned as a substitute for that
sort of monitoring: “So [an enhanced capital requirement] clearly
isn’t the answer. Boards need simple and commonsense—but powerful—tools to cut through the complexity and push management behavior in the direction of responsible risk taking.” 177
Krawcheck’s article is the extreme example of substituting regulation by pay in place of prudential monitoring, but the idea finds its
way into even more sober debt compensation proposals. Bebchuk,
Spamann, and Tung are careful not to eschew traditional monitoring
mechanisms. 178 Nevertheless, even they suggest that pay regulation
might partially substitute for prudential monitoring. 179 For example,
Bebchuk and Spamann suggest:
176. See Krawcheck, supra note 4, at 108 (“The main tool with which boards and regulators have managed risk at banks in recent decades is the capital ratio. The logic is that
the higher the capital ratio—that is, the more money set aside against potential losses—
the lower the risk. This is simple enough in theory but wildly complicated and confusing in
practice. It’s not at all clear what the right amount of capital is; in fact, it’s not even clear
how capital should be measured. At any given board meeting, bank directors will hear
about GAAP capital, capital as measured under the current Basel regime (international
standards set by bank regulators), capital as measured under the coming Basel regime,
and the bank’s own view of the right amount of capital, often called economic capital. Within these categories are various subcategories, including Tier 1 capital, tangible capital, and
total capital. These capital measures often fail to keep up with market events. Also, the
calculations can be shaped by banks’ own assessments of risk, regulators’ assessments of
banks’ risk models, and ratings from rating agencies—all of which are subject to underlying biases, to put it mildly.”).
177. Id.
178. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 278 (“We highlight the limitations of [prudential monitoring], and show that it can be usefully complemented by regulating the incentives of those making the choices from the menu.” (emphasis added)); Tung, supra note
4, at 1209 (“Requiring bankers to hold their own banks’ debt would not substitute for traditional external regulation but would offer an important supplement to the existing regulatory toolkit for constraining bank risk taking.”).
179. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 253-54 (“Regulating bankers’ pay could
nicely supplement and reinforce the traditional, direct regulation of banks’ activities. In-
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[W]hen bank regulators ensure or at least verify that compensation structures do not provide strong incentives to take risks,
banks can be given more discretion to make choices. We do not believe that regulating executives’ incentives alone would be sufficient to ensure the soundness of financial institutions and would
not obviate the need for substantial direct regulation of banks’ actions. But, we do believe that, with experience, banking regulators
may sometimes be able to reduce traditional regulation of the menu
of actions when bank executives’ incentives are more in line with the
regulation’s goals. 180

The qualifications in that prescription—regulators’ ability to “ensure”
or “verify” the impact of compensation structures and an incremental
approach based on “experience” going forward 181—are surely appropriate. However, whether they offer much comfort is another question. Note that the relative weights to place on regulation by pay and
more traditional tools are to be determined by regulators, the same
regulators whose poor performance is driving the regulation-via-pay
project in the first place. If regulatory agency costs are significant, it
is hard to imagine why anyone should expect regulators to strike the
optimal balance among these various tools. If their natural inclination tends toward forbearance as the premise underlying the project
suggests, new levels of debt compensation might grease the skids
toward that result.
What is more, evaluation of compensation incentive-shifting ability is notoriously difficult. 182 Many studies have purported to demonstrate a link between compensation-based incentives and firm per-

deed, if pay arrangements are designed to discourage excessive risk-taking, direct regulation of activities could be less tight than it should otherwise be.” (emphasis added)); Tung,
supra note 4, at 1247 (“For example, better prudential incentives in executive pay arrangements may justify . . . less stringent capital requirements, or less burdensome reporting requirements or on-site examinations for a given bank.” (emphasis added)). Tung makes
the point even more explicitly in a subsequent paper. Tung & Wang, supra note 113, at 4
(“Not only may banking regulation offer a substitute for corporate governance, as some
believe; we offer the first evidence that governance—in the form of bank CEO compensation structure—may substitute for banking regulation, as a number of commentators have
recently proposed.” (emphasis added)).
180. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 286 (emphasis added).
181. Tung also suggests that the exact contours of pay regulation and its substitution
for prudential monitoring “will need to be worked out through practical experience.” Tung,
supra note 4, at 1251.
182. Igor Filatotchev & Deborah Allcock, Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: A Contingency Framework, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2010, at 20, 21 (“Despite
considerable research effort, the empirical findings on these causal linkages [between compensation-based incentives and firm performance] have been mixed and inconclusive. For
example, empirical studies and meta-analyses of the effects of executive equity-related
incentives on financial performance have failed to identify consistently significant
effects.”).
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formance. 183 Yet the majority of those studies covered earlier periods
when the vigorous alternative mechanisms described above were not
nearly as strong. We have little evidence of the leverage that pay
tweaking provides in today’s corporate governance environment.
More importantly, it is near impossible to infer causation in those
studies. Compensation structure is as likely to be an endogenous
output, given a firm’s characteristics, as it is to be an exogenous input.184 Even those who otherwise approve of a robust incentive-pay
regime sound a cautious note with regard to the evidence of its actual
effects. 185 However, despite all of this qualification, there is no doubt
that the vast majority of law and finance scholars, to say nothing
of other corporate governance activists, subscribe to some version
of the view that compensation structure materially moves firm performance. It seems safe to presume that a similar faith might be
shown by regulators when evaluating the efficacy of any new debt
compensation incentives.
Adverting to regulation by pay, then, is apt to do more than serve
as a belts-and-suspenders addition to the regulatory arsenal. Given
(1) the potential for regulator agency costs in determining the balance between regulation by pay and traditional prudential monitoring, and (2) the unhappy experience with evaluating the impact of
pay design on incentives, there is a good possibility that the inclusion
of regulation by pay will actually lower overall regulation of banks, in
direct tension with the reformers’ goals.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is great reason to expect little from adding debt compensation to the pay packages of bank managers and little reason to expect
very much. Any new debt incentives are liable to be overwhelmed by
183. See Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation 23-25 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 77, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582232 (offering a sample of such
studies).
184. Id. at 23 (studies could indicate “compensation affects performance, because firm
performance affects pay, or because an unobserved firm or CEO characteristic affects both
variables”); Dennis Wright Michaud & Yunwei Gai, CEO Compensation and Firm Performance 1-2 (Dec. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531673 (finding that only cash bonuses were correlated with
improved firm performances and that even that relationship is vulnerable to endogeneity
concerns, i.e., compensation “was simultaneously determined with performance”).
185. See Murphy, supra note 37, at 2539 (“Unfortunately, although there is a plethora
of evidence on dysfunctional consequences of poorly designed pay programs, there is surprisingly little direct evidence that higher pay-performance sensitivities lead to higher
stock-price performance.”); Core et al., supra note 9, at 34 (describing conflicting studies
regarding the relationship between equity compensation and firm performance while noting “[t]here is presently no theoretical or empirical consensus on how stock options and
managerial equity ownership affect firm performance”).
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even middling career concerns on the part of the managers. And, the
best version of pay tinkering vis-à-vis traditional prudential bank
monitoring appears to be one that is bound to be suboptimal at many
firms. What is more, a range of other criticisms might be reasonably
leveled at the recent proposals, some more persuasive than others.
Still, there is something to be said for experimentation in light of
apparently ineffective prudential monitoring mechanisms. As confidence in capital requirements or bank monitors wanes, it is natural
to search for alternatives. But there is a real chance that adding debt
to bankers’ pay, even cautiously, will exacerbate those problems with
traditional bank regulation. To the extent errors have been made in
evaluating incentive pay’s effects before, the downside was simply
excessive compensation costs at individual firms and perhaps some
increase in income inequality across society without an equivalent
gain in firm performance. Getting pay’s effects wrong in the bank
regulatory context is more troubling, given our hard-earned understanding of the downsides of excessive bank risk. If regulators were
more vigilant, that might be a risk worth taking, but if they were, we
would not need bank regulation via pay in the first place.
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